H.E. Didier Reynders, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Affairs;

H.E. Alexander De Croo, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Development Cooperation, Digital Agenda, Post and Telecommunications;

H.E. Theo Francken, State Secretary for Asylum and Migration;

H.E. Ambassador Gregoire Vardakis, Special Envoy For Migration and Asylum;

Mr. Peter Sutherland, UN SRSG for International Migration and Development;

H.E. Ambassador Pierre Vimont, Carnegie Foundation;

Mr. François De Smet, Myria Director.

Introduction

A. It’s a singular honor for me to be included in today’s important Migration Conference. Deputy Prime Minister Reynders shared with me and others as early as last year’s UNGA, and later at Istanbul, his plans to hold such a major conference as an integral part of Belgium’s chairmanship of the IOM Council. This is unique in my experience with IOM, and we are proud of Belgium’s leadership as IOM Chair. In this regard, I am pleased that our current Council Chair, Belgium Ambassador Bertrand De Crombrugghe, is with us today, and I wish to thank him for the major contributions he has made and is continuing to make as Council Chair and earlier as a Council Member.

So let me start by thanking the Government of Belgium for organizing this conference, in conjunction with the Belgian Presidency of the IOM Council -- a timely Presidency that coincides with the 65th anniversary celebration of our Organization.

B. Migration is as old as humankind. Yet, migration, or human mobility, rarely receives the attention, recognition and thought it truly deserves -- in particular, considering migration’s pervasiveness and impact on everyone’s lives. Few areas of public policy are subject to greater neglect or misrepresentation in public and political conversation than international migration. The contemporary discourse is overwhelmingly focused on the crises of the moment. Given the amount of media attention these crises receive, and – more importantly – given their humanitarian dimension, this is perhaps only to be expected. They will probably continue to loom large in our field of vision for some time to come. Regrettably, however, this “crisis focus” dampens our ability to do two important things:

• First our ability to understand and appreciate the key role that migration plays in development; and,
• Second, our ability to look ahead, and to evolve long-term, comprehensive migration and asylum policies.

I am, therefore most grateful for the opportunity to turn away from our pressing preoccupations of the moment to look at migration from a broader and, hopefully, from a more realistic perspective.

Migration is a mega-trend of our time and likely to remain so throughout this century. There are three important policy challenges that I think will persist for the next three or so decades -- challenges which need to be recognized and addressed now – and these are:

• Demography
• Diversity
• Disasters

I. The Demographic Challenge

Let me begin by pointing to demographic realities and trends.

 

• First, the populations of developed countries – the so-called “Global North” are contracting. Northern populations will continue to decline throughout the time period on which this conference is focused – namely, 2016-2050. Put another way, developed countries are facing and will continue to face a decline in birth-rates leading to a “demographic deficit”, leading to steady population decline.

  People in the industrialized world are living longer, and having fewer children. And, fewer children means fewer parents.
   

• Second, these population contingents are ageing and will continue to grow old.
  • The world population share of the current EU Member States halved from 14.7% in 1950 to 7.2% in 2010, and it is expected to drop close to 5.0% in 2060 (Eurostat).
  • Those aged 65 and over will increasingly become a much larger share of the population, rising from 18% to 28% of the population. Those aged 80 and over will increase from 5% to 12% of the population -- becoming almost as numerous as the youth population in 2060.
      
• Third, it follows, therefore, that the domestic labour supply in developed countries is getting smaller and is likely to continue to shrink.
  • In the EU area, the domestic labor supply is projected to decline by 14 million workers between 2023 and 2060 or just over 9%. (Eurostat).
  • Labour market shortfalls will be felt particularly keenly in the highly-skilled sectors. Already by 2020 the EU estimates that it will face a shortfall of 1 million highly skilled workers in the healthcare sector alone; and 756,000 unfilled vacancies for highly skilled IT professionals or around 130,000 vacancies per year.

In contrast, trends in the developing world are forecast to go, broadly speaking in opposite directions. The populations of countries of origin in Africa and Asia continue to grow rapidly, with most of their populations already concentrated in younger age cohorts.

• By 2050, Africa’s population is expected to double from 1.1 billion to 2.3 billion. (e.g., when I was Ambassador in Nigeria in the early 90’s, the population was 100 million and today, Nigeria has a population of 160 million.)
• By the year 2050, it is estimated that Africa’s working age population (15-65 years old), will reach close to 1.4 billion.
  • Along the way (in 2032), Africa will have acquired a larger working population than China and by 2036, a larger worker population than India.

The interplay of these population dynamics, and in particular, the widening gradient between the increase in demand for labor in the Global North and the increase in labor supply in the Global South will give rise to important and difficult issues for policy makers. For example:

• To what extent could migration help offset the birthrate deficit?
• To what extent could migration help states manage the decline in what demographers term the Potential Support Ratio (PSR), that is, the ratio of the working age population versus the retiree population?
  • In 1950, for example, when the ratio of the working age population to retirees was about 12 to 1, that is, 12 workers supporting 1 retiree. By 2050, in many developed countries -- Germany or Japan for example – this ratio could fall to as low as 1.5 working age person per elderly person.
• To what extent could migration help developed states in the Global North manage their projected labor shortages, and enable them to retain their advantages of productivity, competitively, and creativity?

There is no ready-made prescription. The overall challenge is to formulate the right blend of migration policies to meet current and future social and economic needs. For sure, migration will never be the only answer to these needs. It would be foolish to make such a claim. But there can be no doubt that migration has to be part of the answer.

As policymakers, our challenge will be to combine migration with development; and humanitarian concern with economic requirements; and to balance and  conjugate national sovereignty with individual freedom; and national security with human security. These are the parameters within which migration policy will succeed or fail.  This brings me to my second point.

II. The Diversity Challenge

If we assume that migration will have an impact on societies of the future and to a certain extent determine the composition of these societies of the future, then governments will need to come to terms with and manage inexorably growing social, ethnic and religious diversity if their societies and economies are to thrive. (An IMF Study released at last October’s Bank and Fund meeting in Lima, Peru, concluded, in effect, that those countries with migrant friendly policies are more likely to succeed economically than those that don’t.)

In 2011, Eurostat reported that 6.5% of the EU population are foreigners and nearly 10% were born abroad. [1] Among the 3.4 million immigrants during 2013 there were an estimated 1.4 million citizens of non-member countries; 1.2 million people with citizenship of a different EU Member State from the one to which they immigrated; some 830 thousand people who migrated to an EU Member State of which they had the citizenship (for example returning nationals or nationals born abroad), and 6 thousand stateless people. [2]

Social diversity and harmony, of course, extend far beyond human mobility. For a wide variety of reasons, including but not limited to mobility, societies all over the world are becoming increasingly diverse:

• Generational differences, for instance, are now much sharper than before; and,
• the social media are giving rise to a multiplicity of communities many of which are trans-national in nature. The trend is unlikely to change. Many past policy efforts have focused on interventions that could eventually make people “more alike”.

The policy challenge of the future may well be how to harness the power of diversity. For example:

• A diverse population can provide a competitive advantage for all types of economies, in particular small to medium economies, seeking to compete internationally.
  • Migrants help drive economic growth through the culture, skills, languages, motivation and experience they bring.
  • Migrants can have – and historically have had – a positive impact on growth:
    • the “Europe 2020 Strategy” recognizes that migration can be a key to supporting regional economic growth and Europe’s global competitiveness.

At IOM, we see two main ways to address the diversity challenge effectively:

A. Change the migration narrative

First, we must find a way to change the current migration narrative which is toxic. As one whose country was built on the backs of migrants, I can attest that, historically, migration has been overwhelmingly positive. We need to return public discourse to a more balanced and historically accurate narrative. We do so through informed, open dialogue -- a dialogue that recognizes that migration has been an agent of development, that migration and development belong together, and that migration is humankind’s oldest poverty reduction strategy.

Broad-based support for migration policies depends on elected leaders and government officials -- at all levels -- taking the initiative to engage in public information and education programs to create a more balanced, overt migration dialogue with their constituents. This includes addressing concerns and explaining the benefits that migrants bring as well as migrants responsibilities.

An open dialogue combined with integration is necessary for political and public support for good migration policies; and this support is indispensable if the industrialized expects to attract and retain talent and benefit from diversity.

B. Promote migrant integration

Effective integration is essential to managing diversity effectively. Key elements include:

(a) Pre-departure or post-arrival cultural orientation.) IOM has conducted cultural-orientation effectively for a number of countries over several decades);

(b) Language classes upon arrival;

(c) Livelihoods as soon as possible after arrival (once a migrant has a job, they cease being a migrant and become a productive member of the host community);

(d) Access to public services (healthy migrants make healthy communities, and educated migrant children grow up to contribute to the community); and,

(e) Public education and public information programs as well as community-based activities that help host populations learn about migrants, develop mutual respect for each other’s rights and responsibilities, and include migrants in their communities.

Integration also requires us to embrace and manage various kinds of diversity:

• to accept that migrants, like their hosts, have multiple identities, and can retain their roots and interests in countries of origin while becoming part of host societies and investing in them.
  • Integration requires the full participation of all actors -- migrants and host communities alike. Migrants and non-migrants alike can be brought to share some common interests and core values – interests and values that can glue diverse societies together. Furthermore,
  • There is no contradiction between the integration of migrants, on the one hand, and their remaining an active diaspora contributing to their countries of origin and families back home.

III. The Humanitarian Disaster Challenge

Unfortunately, I cannot end my remarks today without going back to the on-going crises that beset many countries today – crises which I believe will continue to haunt us tomorrow. More people are on the move than in any other time in recorded history: one in every seven persons in the world.

Unfortunately, among these are 60 million forced migrants, the largest number since World War II -- driven by an unprecedented number of simultaneous, complex and protracted disasters and conflicts -- interlinked humanitarian emergencies across an “Arc of Instability” stretching from the Western bulge of Africa to Asia.

Desperation compels people to migrate under dangerous circumstances: already, some 200,000 irregular migrants arrived in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean, the Aegean and land borders in Europe this year. On land and at sea, these migrants have left a “trail of tears” -- victims of criminal gangs of smugglers who torture, extort and dehumanize their victims. These “travel agents of death” are responsible for the death of some 1,400 migrants already this year. Those are the ones whose bodies have been recovered; many more lie under the sea or in the desert sands. The world’s crises have uprooted 20 million[3]  refugees, and internally displaced 40 million[4] persons.

Unfortunately, I do not see any immediate resolution to the ongoing crises and conflicts, apart from the hope that the cessation of hostilities in Syria will hold and lead to peace.  Even if the fighting were to stop today, the effects will reverberate well into the future.

Moreover, the effects of climate change -- intertwined with those of wars, social and political unrest and entrenched poverty – will exacerbate human insecurity at the global level.  Least developed countries will be most affected as they have fewer resources with which to adapt. Climate change poses pernicious, slow -- yet long term -- threats to the well-being of populations, endangering livelihoods through desertification, water stress, droughts and food shortages.

Some 75 million people live just one meter above sea level, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports that much of this costal land may be under water within the lifetime of the present inhabitants, placing these populations at significant risk of mass displacement.  Kiribati, whose 32 atolls are threatened, is already buying land in Fiji for those likely to be displaced -- giving rise to a new definition of “statelessness”, namely, one loses one’s state.

Now is the time to plan for ways to use adaptation measures to offset current and future adverse impacts of climate change. Addressing climate change, adaptation, and mitigating its effects will be crucial to protecting people, including migrants and displaced persons.

Conclusion

I would like to conclude by highlighting IOM’s migration thesis: For us, increased migration is:

• inevitable, due to demography, disasters, environmental deterioration, the digital revolution, distance-shrinking technologies and other drivers;
• necessary, for durable and equitable economic growth; and,
• desirable, if well-governed.

As I always say, large-scale migration is here to stay: so rather than seeing migration as a problem to be solved, we regard migration as a human reality to be managed. As we face the continuation of simultaneous, unprecedented and complex emergencies, people will continue to flee and resort to migration as a coping mechanism, or a poverty reduction strategy. To face the challenges associated with such scenarios, the international community needs to tackle the root causes actively and promote commonly shared values rather than a shallow debate about identity that will lead us nowhere.

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[1] http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-statistics-in-focus/-/KS-SF-11-034

[2] http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics

[3] UNCHR, latest figures from mid-2015.

[4] UNCHR, latest figures from end of 2014.